Transcript Folie 1
EU-MPCs : Overview of Trade Issues Contents Preliminary remarks The aim of this overview: questions arising from figures An Asymmetric Neighbourhood EU-MPCs integration dynamics Agreements Financial assistance Trade FDI The trade liberalisation process Conclusions Preliminary Remarks: 1. The three pillars within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (also known as the „Barcelona Process“): a) b) c) Political and security partnership, Economic and financial partnership, Social, human and cultural partnership. 2. The main aim of the EMP is to promote economic growth. The main instrument for this is the creation of a Free Trade Area (FTA) by 2010. 3. The components of the EMP: a) The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs) aimed at liberalisation and cooperation in different areas; b) The financial support provided through MEDA and the European Investment Bank 4. How far the FTA will be reached depends on: a) Relative importancy of liberalization to other factors, b) Amount of liberalization achieved by the agreements. The aim of this overview: questions arising from figures. Ten year after the beginning of the Barcelona process it is time to take stock. This is in part the aim of this seminar. Our overview has a narrower aim: to remind you some figures that can help to answer the following questions. Can we identify progress in the process of economic integration between Europe and Mediterranean partner countries? Can we detect some sign of positive impact resulting from the Barcelona process on the MPCs development? Above all, can we say that the role of Europe as economic partner of MPCs has been strengthened by the Barcelona process in comparison with the rest of the world? How attractive does Europe appear as a partner for MPCs in comparison to the rest of the world? The aim of this overview: questions arising from figures. The answers to the above questions are crucial in our view if the general objective of the Barcelona process, and of the announced (future) European Neighbourhood Policy, is to build a security belt around Europe through economic cooperation and integration. An asymmetric neighbourhood Euro Med - per capita GDP (2003) Current international $ 30000 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000 AR EA EU RO KE Y TU R IA SY R N JO RD A AE L IS R O N AN LE B EG YP T A IS I TU N CO O RO C M AL G ER IA 0 Source: World Bank The total GDP of all MPCs is about the GDP of Spain and about 15% lower than the total GDP of EU accession countries. MPCs are small economies characterised by high level of debt … Economic indicators of MPCs (2003) COUNTRIES GDP (level) ALGERIA MOROCCO TUNISIA LIBYA EGYPT LEBANON ISRAEL JORDAN PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES SYRIA TURKEY Note: (1) 2002 Source: World Bank (billion $) 66,53 43,73 25,04 19,13 (1) 82,43 19 110,23 9,86 3,45 21,5 240,38 GDP growth (%) 2000-03 (%) 4,0 3,9 4,2 n.a. 3,8 1,6 1,9 4,2 Debt (% of exports) 86 125 146 n.a. 154 757 n.a. 174 Annual inflation 1995-03 (%) 10,1 1,2 2,9 n.a. 4,7 2,6 3,2 1,0 -9,5 2,4 3,4 n.a. 249 227 10,1 5,1 48,3 … high population and lack of employment Demographic characteristics of MPCs (2003) Population Total (mln) 31,8 30,1 9,9 5,6 67,6 4,5 6,7 5,3 Growth a) Density (%) (pop/km2) 1,2 13,4 1,2 67,4 0,9 60,5 1,5 3,2 1,4 67,5 1,0 432,7 1,9 302,6 2,1 59,4 Labor force Total (mln) 11,6 12,7 4,1 2,0 27,1 1,4 2,8 1,9 Growth a) (%) 4,0 2,5 2,5 3,0 3,0 3,1 2,8 4,3 Urban Unemployment b) population (%) 58,8 57,4 67,4 88,5 42,9 90,6 92,1 79,1 (%) 28,1 12,4 15,0 30 c) 10,0 18 d) 9,8 13,2 ALGERIA MOROCCO TUNISIA LIBYA EGYPT LEBANON ISRAEL JORDAN PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 3,4 4,3 546,6 n.a. 24,2 n.a. n.a. SYRIA 17,4 1,9 94,0 52,5 6,0 4,2 11,5 TURKEY 70,7 1,2 91,2 67,0 33,5 2,3 10,5 a) Annual growth 2000-03; b) average percentage labour force (2000-03); c) 2004; d) 1997 est. Source: World Bank, FAO, CIA • High growth of labour force • High unemployment levels The economies have not been able to grow fast enough to absorb a fast growing labour force (except Israel) Causes of slow economic growth: Oil dependancy, … Exports from MPCs (2003) 50000 40000 Million $ 30000 20000 10000 0 ALGERIA MOROCCO TUNISIA EGYPT LEBANON Total Oil excluded ISRAEL JORDAN SYRIA TURKEY …High protection… Trade restrictiveness and Mean Tariff (2003) 5 40 4 31,5 3 35 34,5 30 22 20,3 17,1 2 20 17,1 14,9 1 12,4 8,8 5,6 (1 5) Y E U KE YR S P AL ES TI N IA N TE TU R IA S IT O R IE N JO R D A R R L AE AN B IS R O N PT G Y E YA LI B IA IS TU N LE M O R O C LG E C O 0 R IA 0 A 10 4,4 Freedom Index Simple Average MFN Tariff Note: Freedom index: Free (Score 1-1,99), Mostly Free (Score 2-2,99), Mostly Unfree (Score 3-3,99), Repressed (Score 4-5) Source: World Bank, Heritage Foundation With exeption of Israel, all MPCs have protectionist trade policies …Extensive state interference in economy… Public sector employment accounts for 1/5 of non-military employment in MPCs The contribution of the public sector on the GDP is significant (30% in Egypt and Tunisia, close to 60% in Algeria) Public investments in MPCs are close to 40% of total investment Over-staffed public sector Dominant presence of state enterprises Causes of slow economic growth in MPCs Source: Kuiper, De Crescenzo (2004) Agriculture is an important sector but its role in the economy differs among MPC Contribution of agriculture to GDP and employment in MPCs (2003) Composition GDP (%) Agriculture labor force Agriculture Industry Services (% total labor force) 1990 2003 ALGERIA 10,3 55,1 34,7 26 14 MOROCCO 16,8 29,6 53,6 45 40 TUNISIA 12,1 28,1 59,8 29 22 a) LIBYA 7,6 b) 49,9 b) 42,5 b) n.a. 17 EGYPT 16,1 34,0 49,8 40 32 LEBANON 12,2 20,1 67,7 7 n.a. ISRAEL 2,8 a) 37,7 a) 59,5 a) 4 3 JORDAN 2,2 26,0 71,8 5 c) PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES n.a. n.a. 6,2 12,0 81,8 SYRIA 23,5 28,6 48,0 32 30 TURKEY 13,4 21,9 64,7 n.a. 36 Note: a) est.; b) 2005 est.; c) 2001 est. Source: World Bank, CIA world factbook Agreement integration dynamics The region trade integration has broadly remained unchanged for two decades, but in the last few years some significant efforts have been made. EMAAs, WTO, GAFTA and Agadir membership of MPCs EMAA WTO GAFTA Agadir Signed Effective Member ALGERIA 2002 b) observer MOROCCO 1996 2000 1995 1998 2003 TUNISIA 1995 1998 1995 1998 2003 LIBYA observer 1998 EGYPT 2001 2004 1995 1998 2003 LEBANON 2002 c) observer 1998 ISRAEL 1995 2000 1995 JORDAN 1997 2002 2000 1998 2003 PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 1997 1997 a) SYRIA d) 1998 TURKEY 1995 1995 1995 Note: a) Agreements with the Palestinians Territories are an interim agreement; b) Ratification of agreement with Algeria is pending; c) With Lebanon an interim agreement for early implementation of trade measures is in force since March 2003; d) Negotiations with Syria are ongoing since 1997; e) Libya is an observer until UN sanctions are lifted. Source: EU Commission, WTO Current MPCs trade MPCs are relative trade-dependent economies. The sum of exports and imports of Mediterraneans countries amounted to more than 55% of their GDP in 2003 Imports and exports (% gdp) 1980 1990 1995 ALGERIA 64,7 48,4 57,9 MOROCCO 45,3 58,9 61,5 TUNISIA 85,8 94,2 93,4 LIBYA 97,6 70,8 51,6 EGYPT 73,4 52,8 50,0 LEBANON 117,9 77,1 ISRAEL 103,1 80,1 75,4 JORDAN 124,1 154,7 124,6 PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES n.a. n.a. 76,8 SYRIA 54,8 56,3 69,0 TURKEY 17,1 30,9 44,2 Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database 2000 63,8 69,0 91,9 51,0 39,2 50,8 85,8 110,2 2003 63,3 68,7 90,3 45,3 52,4 81,4 114,6 75,2 67,8 55,6 59,0 73,2 58,6 The EU is the main trading partner of the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPC), accounting for almost 50% of imports and exports of the region as a whole, although ist weight decreased in the last decade Exports and Imports of MPCs (1995-2003) Exports to EU25 (% of total exports) 1995 2003 ALGERIA 66 55 MOROCCO 60 69 TUNISIA 80 78 LIBYA 82 80 EGYPT 47 42 LEBANON 25 19 ISRAEL 33 28 JORDAN 6 3 PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES n.a. n.a. SYRIA 59 47 TURKEY 55 55 Source: UNCTAD Imports from EU25 (% of total imports) 1995 2003 60 62 52 63 71 74 66 63 40 37 50 49 53 41 34 24 n.a. n.a. 35 30 48 47 •The share of exports from Morocco to the EU has grown and Turkey remained constant. The relative share of the EU in the exports of the other countries has been declining • The EU share of imports from MPCs has decreased in most of the countries (except Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia), indicating a diversification in the import pattern of MPCs in relation to the rest of the world •In 2004, the MPCs share in total EU25 imports is 8,1 (6,9 in 1999) and in total EU25 exports is 8,5 (8,2 in 1999) Inter Arab Trade does not seem to be affected by the EMP: only in Morocco the IAT/TET ratio has decreased between 1995 and 2003 Inter-Arab Trade/ Total External trade (Millions of USD) Total Inter Country Arab Trade JORDAN 1.496 EMIRATES 3.291 BAHRAIN 2.169 TUNISIA 991 ALGERIA 560 SAUDI ARABIA 6.474 SUDAN 537 SYRIA 1.298 SOMALIA 185 IRAQ 714 OMAN 2.142 QATAR 572 KUWAIT 1.263 LEBANON 761 LIBYA 1.135 EGYPT 924 MOROCCO 1.145 MAURITANIA 37 YEMEN 738 26.431 TOTAL Source: Arab Monetary Fund 1995 Total Ratio External IAT/TET Trade (%) 5.155 29 45.073 7 7.878 28 13.817 7 20.139 3 77.455 8 1.797 30 8.679 15 417 44 1.090 66 10.218 21 5.610 10 20.716 6 7.485 10 17.021 7 15.180 6 14.453 8 1.229 3 3.521 21 276.931 10 Total Inter Arab Trade 1.657 4.619 1.750 1.148 503 7.016 447 1.138 94 1.449 3.048 1.269 1.740 1.094 998 2.048 1.689 40 1.042 32.789 2000 Total Ratio External IAT/TET Trade (%) 6.496 26 84.844 5 11.028 16 14.389 8 30.294 2 107.671 7 3.359 13 9.072 13 375 25 18.272 8 15.797 19 14.845 9 25.992 7 6.931 16 16.071 6 23.980 9 18.949 9 1.184 3 6.121 17 415.672 8 Total Inter Arab Trade 2.807 7.582 2.676 1.386 1.144 10.146 1.475 2.241 136 1.261 3.249 1.552 2.038 1.484 1.186 2.848 1.642 69 1.819 46.741 2003 Total Ratio External IAT/TET Trade (%) 8.421 33 111.562 7 12.155 22 20.318 7 38.269 3 131.983 8 5.424 27 10.565 21 483 28 13.045 10 18.242 18 19.314 8 31.623 6 8.612 17 18.002 7 23.495 12 22.928 7 1.565 4 7.440 24 503.445 9 FDI FLOWS Small FDI´s inflows in the region: one of the lowest rate worldwide. FDI Inflows (1970, 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000-2004) FDI Inflows (1970, 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000 -2004) 3000000 160 000 140 000 2500000 120 000 1500000 Millions USD Millions USD 2000000 World 1000000 Developed countries 100 000 80 000 60 000 40 000 20 000 500000 Developing countries 0 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 While global FDI flows have increased at a dramatic rate over the past 15 years 2004 0 1970 Africa 1980 1990 1995 2000 2001 Latin America and the Caribbean 2002 Asia 2003 MPCs …FDI into the MPCs has been minimal and stagnant, representing around 1% of the world FDI flows 2004 Between 2001 and 2004 MPCs share in EU‘s FDI flows has grown … EU25 FDI outflows (2004) EU25 FDI outflows (2001) Asia (- MPCs countries) 9% MPCs 1% EU25 52% America 33% Africa (- MPCs countries) 1% Other countries 1% Asia (- MPCs MPCs countries) 1% 10% Other countries 6% America 11% Africa (- MPCs countries) 4% Europe-EU25 7% Europe-EU25 3% …but it tooks only 1.4% of total EU´s FDI. EU25 61% Between 2001 and 2004, the share of EU25 and US in MPCs total inflows was about 50% (31% EU25, 15% US). EU25 and USA FDI outflows to MPCS 5000 4500 Millions USD 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 EU25 US 2001 Source: Eurostat EU25 US 2002 EU25 US 2003 EU25 US 2004 Why Such a Small FDI Share? •The region has long been plagued by violent conflict and instability •Several Mediterranean states have compounded this problem with poor economic governance •Governments have monopolies in most strategic sectors – especially energy •Private sectors are generally small and largely dominated by family business groups • Poor social and physical infrastructures (eg. education and transport) diminish the attractiveness of the region. Electricity per capita, telecom and internet penetration rates are relatively poor • Underdeveloped financial sectors (eg. central and private banking infrastructures) impede the mobilization and channelling of funds. • Strong local partners (eg. experienced local contracting firms) have been lacking, and there is a shortage of skilled labour • Several of the region’s administrations have lacked accountability and consistency (a feature of autocratic systems of governance). •There are still significant trade barriers in UE and MPCs Measures to improve FDI conditions specified under Barcelona Process •Withdrawal of the state so as to: improve resource allocation and competitiveness; increase budgetary resources; encourage national and foreign private investment •In-depth reform of indirect taxation, so as to reduce fiscal pressure on foreign trade •Opening up of financial intermediation activities to competition and scaling down public sector involvement in this field •Support for privatisation in the Mediterranean region Financial support through MEDA and EIB • A cornerstone of the EMP is a financial support for the whole region through MEDA. • MEDA is comparable to the PHARE (Eastern Europe) and TACIS (Central Asia) programmes. • MEDA replaced previous bilateral aid protocols. The Funds: MEDA I (1995-1999) 3,435 million € MEDA II (2000-2006) 5,350 million € • MEDA pursues the creation of an EMFTZ by 2010 by supporting mainly structure adjustment programmes and economic transition programmes •The biggest difference of the new European Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs) with former agreements from the 1970s is the reciprocity • In addition, the European Investment Bank has launched in 2002 the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) for promoting private sector development.Total loans in 2004: 2,2 billion €. • The main competitor of the EU, the US, has already FTAs with Israel (1985) and Jordan (2002) and in 2003 launched a plan to create the Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) by 2013. Comparison of EU and US financial contributions MEDA I and II commitments and USAID economic assistance MEDA I e II Commitments USAID economic assistance 1995-99 2000-04 1995-99 2000-04 1995-99 2000-04 1995-99 2000-04 Millions Millions (% total (% total Millions Millions (% total) (% total) euro euro bilateral) bilateral) USD USD 164 233 6 10 3 14 0 0 656 678 25 29 85 136 1 1 428 329 17 14 6 1 0 0 686 354 27 15 4307 3172 38 31 182 74 7 3 57 197 1 2 5980 3659 53 36 254 204 10 9 511 2089 5 21 ALGERIA MOROCCO TUNISIA EGYPT LEBANON ISRAEL JORDAN PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 111 351 4 SYRIA 99 136 4 TOTAL BILATERAL 2580 2359 100 TOTAL REGIONAL 480 739 TOTAL 3060 3098 Source: European Commision, USAID Greenbook 15 6 100 354 3 0 9 0 11303 922 0 10191 11303 10191 100 100 Between 1995 and 2004, the EU15 share in total MPCs grants and loans has decreased from 53% to 45%. EU15 ODA grants and loans in MPCs 100 (% of total) 80 60 40 20 Source: OCDE 2004 Y KE TU R IA IS TU N IA YR S TE P AL . O R O C M 1995 R R . C O YA LI B B AN O N N LE JO R D A L AE IS R PT G Y E A LG E R IA 0 The Liberalisation Process a) The Liberalisation of Agricultural trade •Key sector in most of the MPCs, for which the EU is the principal overseas market. • EU Agricultural trade policies are a complex system of seasonal preferences for sensitive products (e.g. tomatoes and oranges) • EU quantity and quality restrictions: Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) on a large number of fresh fruit and vegetables and some dried or processed ones, as well as flowers, Tunisian olive oil and all qualities of wine; Reference quantities (RQs) imposed on many fresh fruit and vegetables, some dried or processed ones, nuts, and fresh and preserved tropical fruit; Sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards •MPC preferences are even more limited, both in terms of share of preferential over total trade flows and in term of tariff reductions for strategic products, like cereals and milk, that lead to high domestic prices. The Liberalisation Process Even if a liberalisation of agricultural trade would have enormous impact on Euro-Med trade flows, no defined prospect for the liberalisation of agriculture was stressed under the Barcelona Process There have been no significant new concessions made by the EU for agriculture products in the EMAAs, nor are these expected to come about in the near future The Liberalisation Process b) The liberalisation of Industrial products trade The EMAAs set out a trade liberalisation commitment by the MPCs, which complements the tariff-free treatment for industrial goods already granted to their exports to the EU since mid-1970s Under the EMAAs the MPCs gradually remove all tariffs on imports of industrial products from EU over by 2010. The specific time schedules for dismantling are differentiated according to the sensitivity of the goods. Tunisia is ahead of other MPCs in reforming ist economy and implementing a range of major reforms, except for abolishing trade barriers. If the liberalisation of manufactured goods was implemented overnight, 1/3 of the industrial firms would go bankrupt. With a view to achieving a full FTA, the MPCs are also expected to implement free trade among themselves (South-South integration) The Liberalisation Process The liberalisation of textiles and clothes trade •The countries in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean area employ over 3.7 million people in the textile sector: 39% of total employment in Morocco, 41% in Tunisia, 34% in Turkey. •The share of T&C exports of their total exports to the EU is high (e.g. 54% for Tunisia, 53% for Morocco, 47% for Turkey) •The importance of this sector is double: -Because of the very important dependance of MPCs on the Eu market for their exports and employment; -Because of the close relationship between EU T&C industry and the T&C industry of those countries, via investment and subcontracting relationships •In 2004, the EU imports from MPC represent 28% of EU textile market (12,8 billion €) and EU exports to MPC represent 14% of EU textile market (2,3 billion €) •Due to WTO, the Agreement on textiles and clothing expired on 2005 •Between January and May 2004, the EU imports from China represent 11% of EU textile market. One year late, the EU imports from China represent 22% of EU textile market. The Liberalisation Process c) The liberalisation of trade in Services The liberalisation of trade in services • will spill over into the production and export of goods • will serve to improve the functioning e.g., transport, energy, telecoms, finance in the MPCs • Regional solutions to promote liberalisation of trade in services: Reform of the transport sector at national level, definition and promotion of an efficient regional transport infrastructure network, with national transport systems linked to each other and with Trans-European Networks Development of appropriate energy policies Modernisation of the telecomunications sector and facilitation of interconnections as a prerequisite for the development of the Information Society. The Liberalisation Process In the context of the EU’s relationship with its Mediterranean partners, rules of origin (ROOs) are increasingly seen as playing an important role. In principle the Mediterranean partners should adopt what is known as the “pan-European system of cumulation of rules of origin” Rules of origin can indeed serve to restrict suppliers’ ability to buy their inputs from the cheapest available source. In so doing rules of origin impact upon patterns of trade, production and consequently also welfare. Clearly to the extent that rules of origin do indeed have such an impact, this is likely to fall most heavily on small, possibly less diversified economies, who consequently find it more difficult to source their inputs domestically and competitively. Conclusion 1 What do these figures tell us? The European Commission has reached a critical level in order to have a significant impact on national policies only in some Mediterranean Partner Countries. The total MEDA I and II commitments for the period 1995 -2004 have been less than one third of the USAID economic assistance for the same period (even if this assistance has been concentrated in three countries: Israel, Egypt and Jordan). The EU15 (European Commission and member states) share in total MPCs grants and loans has decreased from 53 % to 45 %. Conclusion 2 The MPCs are not following the global trend towards trade liberalisation and this implies that these countries are losing in terms of international competitiveness relative to other regions in the world. This creates a cumulative process: high protection rates increase the relative strength of import-substitution inefficient industries and in this way the strength of lobbies in favour of maintaining high protection rates increases as well. The mechanism is made possible in presence of inflows of foreign exchange coming from remittances, export of natural resources, financial official assistance (grants and loans) and FDI. A role in maintaining the mechanism was the preferential access to European markets that some MPCs countries enjoyed for some products (for example textiles and clothes). Currently, the liberalisation of textiles and clothes imports from Asia dramatically changes the context in which MPCs have to compete in European markets and the expected returns of investments made in these sectors. Conclusion 3 Some final considerations within the framework above described: Trade liberalisation needed for attracting more FDI and increase competitiveness of the MPCs production creates major problems for government tariff revenues and for the social impact of the structural adjustment process in both import-substitution industries and export-oriented industries. Which are the financial resources and the size of unilateral trade liberalization that EU is willing to offer to MPCs for alleviating their structural adjustment? Conclusion 3 The increasing trade with the US suggests that their trade agreements and financial support are more effective than the European initiatives. In fact, when the prime objective is political as well as related to creating development, the quantity of assistance, both in terms of absolute value and in proportion to the offer by other donors, becomes an important factor in the effectiveness of the policy itself. This is the case particularly when other countries offer assistance, having objectives not always consistent with or in conflict with European ones. In conclusion what does the EU currently offer to MPCs in order to carry on the Barcelona process?