Transcript Document

Multilateralism & Regionalism
- The Development Interface Short Course on Key Issues on the International
Economic Agenda for Permanent Missions in
Geneva, 23 November 2007
Taisuke ITO
DITC/UNCTAD
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UNCTAD/CD-TFT
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Context & Questions
 WTO Doha Negotiations go slowly
 More movement towards RTAs?
 RTAs already proliferated. What is new?
 Implications for development & MTS?
 RTAs are here to stay. How to make them
more useful for developing countries given
evolving MTS?
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Outline
I.
Recent trends & issues in RTAs
II. Interface between WTO & RTAs:
Developmental perspective
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Part I
Recent Trends & Issues in
RTAs
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Number of Notified RTAs by Year of Entry
into Force: 1948-2007
Source: WTO
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5
RTA MEMBERSHIP ACROSS THE WORLD (March 2002)
6
Source:
WTO
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RTA MEMBERSHIP ACROSS THE WORLD (2007)
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Source:
WTO
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FUTURE PROSPECTS
Dominican
Republic
Myanmar
Cambodia
Nicaragua
El Salvador
Russia
Indonesia
Bhutan, Maldives,
Nepal, Pakistan
Costa
Rica
Brunei Darussalam
Viet Nam
Laos
USA
Philippines
Malaysia
Bangladesh
Paraguay
Brazil Argentina
Thailand
India
Sri Lanka
Panama
Guatemala
Honduras
Singapore
Uruguay
New Zealand
Chile
Mexico
Japan
People’s Rep. of China
Peru
Hong Kong, China
Korea
Chinese Taipei
Australia
Fiji, Solomon Islands,
Vanuatu
Colombia
Bolivia
Ecuador
Venezuela
Papua New Guinea
Fed. States of Micronesia,
Marshall Islands, Kiribati, Palau,
W. Samoa,Tonga, Vanuatu, E. Timor,
Cook Islands, Nauru, Niue, Tuvalu
ASIA
Canada
Bahamas
Haiti
Dominica, Suriname,
Jamaica, St. Lucia, Belize,
St. Kitts & Nevis, Grenada, Barbados,
Guyana, St. Vincent & the Grenadines,
Antigua & Barbuda, Trinidad & Tobago
AMERICAS
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Source: A. Estevadeordal , “New perspective on North-South RTAs”, presentation at a pre-UNCTAD XI seminar
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on regionalism, Rio de Janeiro, 8 June 2004.
Trends in RTAs
 RTA proliferated worldwide since 1990s with WTO &
accelerated with bilateral “hub-&-spoke” FTAs
=> “spaghetti bowl”
 367 notified to WTO of which 214 in force (Dec 2006)
(400 by 2010?)
 DCs active in RTAs => Overlapping (SSA) & multiple
membership (av. 8 RTAs per country in LA, 4 in SSA)
 [Continental scale (FTAA, ACP-EU EPAs)]
 Inter-regional RTAs, mostly bilateral (US-FTAs)
 Block-to-block RTAs (EU-Mercosur, EPAs)
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Trends in RTAs (2)
 Chile, Mexico & Singapore emerged as semi-hubs
 Non-traditional regionalists (India, JPN, KOR, China,
Singapore, Aus, NZ) entered the scene
 N-N RTAs (US-AUS, EU enlargement) re-emerged
 N-S RTAs significant => transform unilateral preferences
to reciprocal preferences
 Emerging DCs got involved (China, US-KOR, EU New
Strategy towards South & SE Asia)
 S-S RTAs reinvigorated, including inter-regional,
plurilateral initiatives
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Why RTAs? Some Motivations
 Political considerations (EU, US FTAs)
 Change in the 1990s in conventional wisdom on economic
policy management and development strategies => trade
integration as key development tool
 RTAs as a platform to participate in expanded
international supply chains (input manufactures ↑ )
 Protection of regional markets from outsiders
 Quicker and deeper than WTO as negotiations easier with
limited number of partners (less free rider problem)
 Lock-in unilateral preferences (N-S RTAs)
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Why RTAs? Some Motivations (2)
 “Domino effects”
 Large RTAs increase the incentive for non-members to join
the RTA to avoid trade creation/diversion (EU
enlargement)  Incentive for insiders to resist
 Countries have incentive to react to the formation of an
RTA by the formation of new RTA, rather than seeking
multilateral approach, in order to maintain competitive
edge vis-à-vis its competitors in key export markets =>
Hub & spoke bilateral FTAs (US, EU & JPN with Mexico)
 Greater bargaining power at multilateral level
 Any effect of the slow pace of the Doha Round?
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RTA proliferation means increased share (%)
of world trade under RTAs
51.2%
43.2%
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2000
2005
13
Note: Estimate based on 113 RTAs in force in 2000 with trade data of 1999. Source: WTO, World Trade
Report
2003.
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New market access under RTAs may be more
limited than it might appear
Share of trade covered (%), 2003
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Including all trade
Excluding 0% MFN
Excluding <3% MFN
Note: Not include intra-EU 15 trade. Source: World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2005. Reported in S.
14 meeting
Andriamananjara, “Regional Integration: Systemic issues from a global perspective” in an UNCTAD Ad-hoc expert
in
15-16 March 2007.
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S-S RTAs proliferate but North’s RTAs
dominate trade covered, not surprisingly
Number of RTAs
Percent of World Trade Covered
35
250
30
200
25
SouthSouth
150
SouthSouth
20
15
100
US
US
10
50
5
EU
EU
0
0
1990
1996
2002
1990
1996
2002
15
Source:
World Bank (2005), ibid.
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US/EU markets large (NAFTA=8%, EU25=
23%) & have higher intra-RTA trade share
than S-S RTAs (2005)
EU 25
66.5
FTAA
60.3
NAFTA
55.8
ASEAN
26.2
MERCOSUR
12.9
CARICOM
11.7
SADC
9.1
ANCOM
8.2
COMESA
4.9
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
16
Note:
Exports. Source: UNCTAD
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For DCs, RTAs seem to be a relatively small
driver of trade reform in the past
Av. Tariffs in Developing Countries
30
29.9
Share of tariff reductions
Regional
Agreements
10%
25
20
Multilateral
Agreements
25%
15
9.3
10
Autonomous
Liberalization
65%
5
0
1983
2003
17
Note:
33 largest DCs covering 90% of DC trade. Source: Martin and Ng, 2004, from World Bank (2005), op. cit.
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Source: Estevadeordal & Robertson (2004). Reported in a presentation by Estevadeordal (2004), op.cit .
Regionalism in the Americas
Open Regionalism
Simultaneous Preferential and MFN Liberalization in Latin America
50
40
MFN Tariffs for 11 countries
30
20
10
Preferential Tariffs of
11 countries with respect to
their RIA partners in the region
0
1985
1987
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1989
1991
1993
1995
18 1997
East Asia has expanded its trade globally &
regionally
•
•
•
Regional trade
significant in
30%
income
generation
25%
With greater
20%
integration into
global supply
15%
chain
10%
Importance of
competitive
5%
supply capacity
0%
Source: World Bank (2005), op. cit.
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Intra-regional trade as a share of GDP, 2002
26.5%
15.3%
6.4%
5.3%
3.5%
0.8%
East Asia Europe & LA
Central Asia
Middle EastSouth
& N. Africa Asia
Sub- 19
Saharan
Africa 19
Intra-RTA trade yet grew faster in S-S RTAs
ASEAN Intra %
ASEAN Intra
ASEAN RoW
Andean Intra %
600.0
Andean Intra
Andean RoW
30
1000.0
16
900.0
500.0
14
25
800.0
12
400.0
700.0
20
10
600.0
300.0
15
200.0
10
500.0
8
400.0
6
300.0
4
100.0
200.0
5
2
100.0
0.0
0
0.0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
SADC Intra %
SADC Intra
SADC RoWl
MERCOSUR Intra %
600.0
12 600.0
500.0
10 500.0
400.0
0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
8
MERCOSUR Intra
MERCOSUR RoW
25
20
400.0
15
300.0
6
300.0
200.0
4
200.0
100.0
2
100.0
0.0
0
0.0
10
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
5
0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Note: 1990=100 (left) & intra-RTA import share (right). Source: UNCTAD
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20
Developing Countries and RTAs
 Some DCs are highly dependent on some trading
partners (West Africa with EU) and tariff revenue
=> significance of N-S RTAs for individual DCs
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M. Kuwayama, “South-South Integration and Cooperation: A Latin American Perspective, presentation at a
pre-UNCTAD XI seminar on regionalism, Rio de Janeiro, 8 June 2004.
S-S RTA have the potential to foster diversification of DC exports into
more value-added & technology intensive products (Latin America
excluding Mexico)
South-North
South-South
52,5%
2000-2002
47,5%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
United
States
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European
Union
Primary Products
Low technology
high technology
Japan
LACs
Asia
Others
Total
NN.RR. based manufactures
intermediate technology
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Excluding22
Mexico
Trade Effects of RTAs
 Some 50% of world trade estimated under RTAs in
2005 as compared to 40% in 2000. Or over 30% (or
20% if MFN duty free excluded)
 DCs liberalization driven mainly by unilateral lib &
RTAs impacts may have been more limited than might
appear & proceeded with MFN liberalization
 Some large North RTAs account for the significant
share given their market size & have higher regional
intensity of trade
 East Asia expanded intra-regional trade not necessarily
relying on preferences => competitive supply capacity
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Trade Effects of RTAs
 N-S RTAs important for individual DCs in terms of
volume & pose adjustment given their import
concentration
 N-S RTAs tend to reinforce existing comparative adv
(natural resource-based or lower value-added products
with high import content)
 S-S RTAs intra-RTA trade is relatively low but steadily
increasing over the past decades with variation across
groupings (ASEAN)
 S-S RTAs (& trade) important for diversification into nontraditional new markets & fast-growing, more valueadded, technology-intensive products (dynamic
comparative adv)
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New Regionalism
 Deep (positive) integration = positive
harmonization of regulatory standards <=>
Shallow (negative) integration = elimination of
trade barriers (tariffs)
 Broader policy coverage: “behind-the-border”
measures (services, IPR, investment, CP, GP)
=> Greater implications for development policy
options
 WTO-plus in scope & depth
Potential for dynamic gains, greater impact on
national economy & development policies.
Positive coherence with MTS matters
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Welfare Effects of an RTA
Positive
 RTAs creates trade (static trade creation)
 RTAs generates dynamic gains from scale
economy, greater competition, FDI inflows &
technology transfer
Negative
 RTAs diverge trade from more efficient third
countries to less efficient RTA partners
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P
Trade Creation & Diversion
S
D
Price ↓, C ↑, P↓, Imp ↑
Producer ↓ (a)
Consumer ↑(abcd)
Gov rev loss ↓(ce)
 Gains from TC (b+d)
 Loss from TD (e)
Pw + t
a
PRTA
b c d
e
Pw
0
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S2 S1 D1
D2
Q
27
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Conditions for Trade Creation & Diversion
 The higher the initial tariffs, the greater the effects, be
it trade creation or diversion
 The lower the post-RTA CET, the more likely it is that
the RTAs is welfare increasing (less TD)
 The greater the number of RTA partners, the more
likely it is that there will be net trade creation
 Wide differences in comparative advantage is likely to
lead to net trade creation
 The higher the share of trade with partner countries
the greater the possibility of welfare enhancing RTAs
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Risk of trade diversion high in RTA with high
external tariffs
NAFTA
AFTA
SADC
EAC
MERCOSUR
COMESA
ECOWAS
SAPTA
0
5
10
15
Average weighted tariffs
Note: Tariffs are import-weighted at the country level to arrive at RTA averages
Source: UN TRAINS/WITS, from World Bank (2005), op. cit.
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25
29
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Policy Issues in Trade Creation & Diversion
 Trade creation = trade adjustment (like any other
liberalization) => Issues for DCs under NS RTAs
 Trade diversion hurts both RTA members and
non-members
 Non-members => Lost export sales. Also hurt by TC
 Members => Lost tariff revenue not compensated by
consumer gains
 MFN reduction an answer? Trade diversion =
static concept => Need to assess trade diversion
relative to the non-static benefits of increased trade
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Rules of Origin
 RoO determine the eligibility for preferential treatment of a
good => can be a powerful trade policy instrument
 Insulate an industry from the consequences of FTA
 Protect intermediate good producers by favoring intra-PTA
supply links (resultant distortion = 4.3% tariffs)
 Be used to attract investment in strategic sectors
 Restrictive rules hampers the use of preferences (e.g.,
double transformation rule for T&C: Yarns => fabrics =>
clothing)
 Cost of compliance (1.8% under NAFTA)
 Often more restrictive in N-S RTAs
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Dynamic Effects
 Economies of scale
 Greater specialization & increased production
 IRS => product differentiation => Intra-Industry
trade




Competition => efficiency => innovation
FDI inflows
Transfer of technology
Productivity & economic growth
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Deeper Integration for Dynamic Gains?
 Potential for greater gains as eliminating NTBs
and harmonizing regulatory standards lead to
larger markets & economies of scale
 Tariff first, NTB next? (S-S RTAs)
 Upwards harmonization entails costs and can be
sub-optimal for DCs
 Broader coverage of behind the border regulatory
issues have implications to domestic development
policy options = policy space loss
33
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RTAs & Policy Space
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Summary
 RTAs proliferated worldwide with impact on trade
 RTAs relevant to development as trade is increasingly
important for GDP & growth and trade policy as
development policy instruments
 New regionalism entail broader & deeper policy coverage
thus affect DC policy space (more than the MTS)
 Regional negotiations matter in determing terms and
conditions of the agreement
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Part II
Interface Between WTO & RTAs
Development Perspective
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Questions
(1) How do RTAs affect WTO/MTS?
(2) How does WTO/MTS affect RTAs?
=> Implications for developing countries in
regional trade negotiations
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(1) How Do RTAs Affect WTO?
“Building block” Thesis
 Quicker & deeper integration for global free trade: Same
goal, different routes through open regionalism
 Competitive liberalization thesis
 Large RTAs increase the incentive for the outsiders to advance
multilateral liberalization to minimize trade diversion (UR & Single
European Market, UR conclusion & NAFTA/APEC)
 Laboratories for testing new approaches (services,
investment, competition policies)
 RTAs as development tool: incubator of production and
export diversification for gradual and strategic integration
into world economy / MTS
 Locking-in of domestic reform at regional level
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(1) How Do RTAs Affect WTO?
“Stumbling block” Thesis
 Inward-looking & protectionist bloc
 Reduce incentive for MTS, esp. in MA and new
issues (WTO-plus, NN RTAs)
 Specialization of areas and «forum-shopping»
(only AG Subsidy & DS for WTO?)
 Administrative burdens and negotiating capital
constraints (overlapping membership to several
RTAs) (RoO)
 Fragmentation of regional rules in new areas &
jurisprudence
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(1) How Do RTAs Affect WTO?
“Stumbling block” Thesis
 Deep integration limits policy space for
proactive development policies
 Policy space and SDT permitted under MTS
overridden (e.g. less than full reciprocity)
 Negotiating leverage at MTS (bilateral FTAs)
 N-S RTAs may weaken S-S RTAs
 Exclusion of small countries / « template » RTA
 « Hub & spoke » RTAs
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(2) How Does WTO Affect RTAs?
(i) WTO rules on RTAs define the conditions
to be met by RTAs
(ii) MFN market access conditions determine
the level of preferences under RTAs
(iii) WTO disciplines on regulatory issues
constitute minimum standards for all
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(i) RTAs and WTO Rules
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(ii) RTAs and WTO Rules
Comment
 WTO rules notoriously ineffective
 Not an answer to discipline proliferation of
RTAs? But not mean rules are useless
 Rules of the game => affect terms of RTAs
 Not matter for many RTAs
 Special relevance for low income vulnerable
DCs seeking flexible terms of RTAs (EPAs)
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WTO Rules on RTAs
Provisions
Coverage
GATT Article XXIV
N-N, N-S RTAs in goods
Enabling Clause
S-S RTAs in goods
GATS Article V
All RTAs in services
All provisions allow for derogation from MFN
obligations in providing preferential treatment to RTA
partners under certain conditions
44
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GATT Article XXIV
Scope
Purpose
(XXIV:4)
Compatibility
criteria
Customs unions, free-trade areas or
interim arrangements for CU or
FTAs
To facilitate trade between the
parties and not to raise barriers to
their trade with other Members.
RTAs must satisfy, inter alia, paras
5 and 8
45
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GATT Article XXIV:5-8
(i) Duties and other restrictive regulations of
commerce (ORRCs) must be eliminated with
respect to substantially all the trade among
parties (para 8(a)(i)&(b))
(ii) Duties and other regulations of commerce
(ORCs) must not be higher or more restrictive
than prior to the RTA formation (para 5(a)(b))
(iii) « Reasonable length of time » for the formation
of CU/FTA should exceed 10 years only in
exceptional cases (para5(c))
(iv) Notification to the CTG, examination &
reporting by CRTA on WTO consistency
46
(«make recommendation» as required)
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Enabling Clause
Scope
Regional or global arrangements entered into
among developing countries for the mutual
reduction or elimination of tariffs & non-tariff
measures
Principles
(a)Be designed to facilitate trade between the
parties and not to raise barriers to or create
undue difficulties for their trade with other
Members; and
(b)not impede the liberalization of trade
between the parties at the multilateral level.
47
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Enabling Clause (2)
 The Enabling Clause does not assume formal link
with GATT Article XXIV conditions
 The Enabling Clause is less stringent than GATT
XXIV as it permits reciprocal preferences on a
limited range of products, & not « substantially all
the trade»
 The clause permits reduce tariffs only, or non-tariff
measures as well, & not « elimination» like GATT
Article XXIV
48
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GATS Article V
Scope
Economic integration agreements (EIAs) in trade in
services
V:4
To facilitate trade between the parties and not to
raise the overall level of barriers to trade in services
vis-à-vis third parties.
V:1(a)
"substantial sectoral coverage" (no of sectors,
volume of trade affected and modes of supply), with
no a priori exclusion of any mode of supply
"the absence or elimination of substantially all
discrimination, in the sense of [GATS] Article XVII"
(national treatment) thorugh elimination of existing
discriminatory measures and/or prohibition of new
measures
49
V:1(b)
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GATS Article V (2)
V:4 & 5
Not raise the overall level of barriers to trade in
services within the respective sectors compared to
the level applicable prior to the EIA
V:3 (a)
Flexibilities shall be provided for DCs regarding
the conditions of V:1 in accordance with the level
of development
Under S-S EIAs, more favorable treatment may
be granted to juridical persons owned or
controlled by natural persons of an EIA member
with respect to substantive business operations
V:3 (b)
50
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Issues in WTO Rules Negotiations
DMD 29: Negotiations aimed at “clarifying and
improving disciplines and procedures” on RTAs while
taking into account “developmental aspects”
 How much is «substantially all the trade»? 90%?
How to measure?
 How long is «reasonable period of time»? 12 years?
What are the «exceptional cases»? How long is
reasonable in such cases?
 How should WTO monitor, examine and decide on
WTO compatibility of an RTA? Transparency
Mechanism adopted in 2006
51
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Debate on SAT Measurement
 Trade (import) value => Measure existing trade rather
than future trade which are subject to prohibitive tariffs &
with no imports. Can exclude many products with small or
no trade value (EU)
 Tariff lines => Can exclude products with high trade value
 How to aggregate (EU) or disaggregate among RTA parties
& among the one party if block-to-block RTA
 How to treat non-zero tariffs => tariff reduction promotes
intra-RTA trade but no incentive if not counted for SAT
 NTBs like TRQ?
 What threshold?
52
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Trade volume 95%
Tariff line 33%
70
60
Trade volume 30%
Tariff line 90%
50
40
30
20
10
0
A - 5%
B10%
C50%
D80%
E100%
F100%
G-
H
J
K
53
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“Substantially All the Trade”
AUS
95% of HS 6-digit line w/o duties & TRQ at the end of
10 year period
No “highly traded products” = >0.2% volume or top 50
imports within RTA
No “significant exports” = >2% of a country’s total
exports to the world
EU
Combined average of trade + tariff line coverage
(Z= (X+Y)/2) w/ threshold to be determined later
ACP
Favorable methodology
Lower threshold levels for DCs (as SDT)
(Non-zero tariffs, TRQ, cumulative or individual)
54
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Transitional Period
AUS
70% of tariff lines at the entry into force
95% of tariff lines at the end of 10 year period
Longer than 10 years only for “interim agreement”
EU
Longer than 10 year period
Clarify “exceptional cases”
ACP
SAT applies only at the end of the transition period
Relax the scope of “exceptional cases” for DCs
No limitation on maximum period in exceptional
cases but, if needed, should be consistent with
development situations (>18 yrs)
55
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55
SDT/Flexibilities for DCs
AUS
EU
Open for some flexibilities for DCs
ACP
Formally & explicitly incorporate SDT in the
application of Art XXIV conditions
Clarify the flexibilities already provided for within the
existing framework:
Extent to which WTO rules already take into account
discrepancy in development levels between RTA parties
Flexibilities available during the transitional period
(length, level of final trade coverage, degree of
asymmetry)
56
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ACP Proposal on GATT Art XXIV





WTO-compatibility (then prevailing) & flexibilities for ACP
under CPA Art 37:7
GATT Art XXIV requires “reciprocity” in liberalizing
“SAT” under RTAs
While SDT is available in MTN through “less-than-full
reciprocity”, the extent of such SDT under RTAs is limited
by reciprocity requirement of GATT Art XXIV
GATT Art XXIV does not include SDT for N-S RTAs while
GATS V does provide SDT
No a priori reason why SDT cannot be included.
Incorporate SDT in the application of Art XXIV conditions
so as to allow for: Lesser product coverage, securer and
longer transition periods, due consideration of
developmental dimension in the examination process
57
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Possible Challenge?
 A third country (MFN exporter) complains:
 EU tariff treatment discriminates against its exports, thus
violates GATT Art I (MFN)
 Such preferential tariff is not justified under GATT Art
XXIV because EPA in question is not an FTA in the sense
of GATT Art XXIV due to product coverage less than
“substantially all” or exceedingly long transition period
 Such EPAs indeed amounts to unilateral preferences
similar to Lomé Convention, thus the Parties should have
sought a WTO waiver
 …although GATT Art XXIV case very limited
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(ii) RTAs and Market Access
Negotiations in Goods &
Services
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Typical Issues in WTO & RTA
Negotiations (vis-a-vis RTA partners)
WTO
RTAs
Export
Issues
Preference
erosion
Exp revenue loss
Improved market
access & market
entry
Import
Issues
Policy space
Policy space
Adjustment
Adjustment
Gov revenue loss Gov revenue loss
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Market access in Goods & Preference Erosion
 MFN market access conditions (tariffs)
determined the level of preference available
to RTA partners
 Preferential benefits are a function of MFN
(& other preferences that may exist)
 WTO negotiations on agriculture & NAMA
could lead to lowering of MFN rates causing
preference erosion
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Market Access Negotiations in Services

No preference erosionas such but potentially
affect the level of “preference” (to the extent
that commitments are GATS-plus)
E.g. US FTAs
 Binding of autonomous liberalization
 Negative list
 GATS-plus commitments sought in some key
sectors (telecom/insurance, banking)
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Services Negotiations & RTAs (2)
Mode 4 & labour mobility
 Global gains of 160 billion from 3% quota in
OECD with 70% accruing from low skill
labour
 RTAs can provide suitable platform but
achievement limited
 Full labour mobility tend to be between similar level of
development = N-N or S-S RTAs
 Mode 4 commitments limited to high-skills (intercorporate transferees)
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(iii) RTAs & Multilateral
Disciplines on Trade-Related
Issues
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RTAs and Negotiations on TradeRelated Issues
(i) TRIPS does not allow for preference – RTA
commitments on IPR to be applied on an MFN
basis
(ii) Where no WTO rules exist (Investment, CP),
RTAs are free to agree on any rule (either on an
MFN or preferential basis)
(iii) Even where no WTO rules exist, some issues are
applied on an MFN basis by nature (T&E, T&L)
RTA negotiations may lead to standard-setting
negotiations that may be applied on an MFN basis
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Conclusions
 The close linkage between WTO & RTAs => Coherent
approach needed to both processes
 RTAs as an avenue for faster and deeper liberalization.
Liberalization more effective vis-a-vis partners as RTAs
eliminate duties on SAT
 RTAs are about preference, thus MFN matters
 DC flexibilities important under N-S RTAs (WTO rules)
 RTAs can affect policy space => Development policy options
 Develop supply capacity and competitiveness to gain from
both WTO and RTA negotiations
 Deeper development cooperation & financial assistance
important as complementary elements
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Thank You
Contacts
Taisuke Ito
E-mail: [email protected]
Tel: +41 22 907 4893
Fax: +41 22 907 0044
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