09.15-key-note-day-1-edmund-penning-rowsell

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FCERM.net Heriot-Watt University, 19 th June 2014

A

‘Reality’

approach to flood risk management research Edmund Penning-Rowsell

Member: Member:

Flood Hazard Research Centre

http://www.fhrc.mdx.ac.uk

Oxford Water Security Network

www.water.ox.ac.uk

Editor:

Environmental Hazards (Taylor and Francis)

http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehaz Copyright (text) FHRC

A

‘Reality’

approach to flood risk management research

Realism in Wikipedia:

A concern for visionary fact or reality (i.e. the idealistic and rejection of the impractical or utopian ) and In its Kantian sense,

realism

contemporary sense,

realism

is contrasted with

idealism

. In a is contrasted with

anti-realism

, primarily in the philosophy of science .

Scientific realism is, at the most general level, the view that the world described by science is the real world, as it is, independent of what we might take it to be.

Realism

(or

naturalism

) in the arts is the attempt to represent subject matter truthfully, without artificiality and avoiding artistic conventions, implausible, exotic and supernatural elements.

‘Realism’ No. 1: Flood warnings.

The reality is that there are many ‘alerts’ and ‘warnings’, but research continues to show that people at risk continue to consider they are not warned well enough, or even at all.

Priest S J, Parker D J, Tapsell S M 2011. Modelling the damage reducing effects of flood warnings using European cases,

Environmental Hazards

, 10, 2, 101-120

‘Realism’ No. 2: Flood insurance.

The reality is that Flood insurance is widely available – internationally unique - but (a) the poor have far less cover and (b) the main beneficiaries of flood ‘defence’ expenditure are the shareholders of insurance companies.

Penning-Rowsell, E.C.

and Pardoe, J. (2012) Who benefits and who loses from flood risk reduction?

Environment and Planning ‘C’,

30, 448 466. doi:10.1068/c10208.

‘Realism’ No. 3: Flood ‘victims’.

The reality of flood victim’s experiences need careful attention, but we also must be aware that victims’ pressure on politicians and others can seriously distort decision making.

Harries, T. and

Penning-Rowsell, E.C.

(2010) Victim pressure, institutional inertia and climate change adaptation: the case of flood risk.

Global Environmental Change

21(1) 188-97, DOI: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.09.002

‘Realism’ No. 4: Spatial planning.

The reality is that – in a small and crowded island - there will always be development in areas at risk of flooding. Such decisions need to be properly understood.

Pardoe, J.,

Penning-Rowsell, E.C.

and Tunstall, S. (2011) Floodplain conflicts: regulation and negotiation,

Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences

, 11, 2889 –2902. DOI:10.5194/nhess-11-2889-2011

‘Realism’ No. 5: Risk assessment.

The reality is ….

First review: Three anonymous peer reviewers (September 2012) The results presented at the Rotterdam 2012 conference (November) Second review: Two anonymous reviewers plus Prof. Paul Bates (Jan 2013) Third review: Prof. Paul Bates (August 2013) The results discussed with senior EA staff (2013): Ian Meadowcroft; Stefan Laeger; Ronan Palmer Paper accepted January 2014 and published on-line

20th March 2014

**A ‘realist’ approach to the extent of flood risk * England and Wales**

Edmund C. Penning-Rowsell

Flood Hazard Research Centre, Middlesex University, London, UK

in

Why is a national economic** assessment of flood risk important?

•

It informs the whole UK discourse and debate about floods, risk management and climate change

•

It therefore affects policy to a significant extent

•

It also affects capital and revenue budgets for flood risk management

* Fluvial and coastal ONLY here ** Not financial losses

(‘Rotterdam 2012, plus’)

Who said a nnual a verage flood d amage was approximately £1bn in England and Wales??

£1bn

Document Foresight Future Flooding (Ex. Sum.) Foresight Future Flooding (Volume 1) Flooding in England (the EA) Flood risk management in England (NAO)

CCRA, main document (flooding)

Quotation

“…even with the present flood defences, we experience an (annual) average of

£1,400 million

of damage (

£1,040

in England and Wales).” “Within the NAFRA 2002 study it was estimated that the annual average economic damage due to flooding is, on average, in the order of

£1billion pa

”.

“The expected annual damages to residential and non-residential properties in England at risk of flooding from rivers and the sea is estimated at

more than £1 billion

.” “The annual costs of flood damage in England are estimated to be at

least £1.1 billion

”.

GoS

2004

Evans

2004

2009

NAO

2011

The EA’s Long Term Investment Strategy CCRA Executive Summary CCRA: Floods and Coastal Erosion, Sector Perspective

“Present day Expected Annual Damage (EAD) to residential and nonresidential properties from tidal or river flooding is

of the order of £1.2 billion in England and Wales

. The EAD is an estimate of the average annual damage to property and contents. The total damage could be much higher if other assets and indirect and intangible losses are included.” “The average annual cost of damage from flooding in England is estimated at

more than £1 billion

. These costs are borne by householders, businesses, central and local government and others including insurance companies”. “Annual damage to UK properties due to flooding from rivers and the sea currently totals around

£1.3billion

(and) is projected to rise to between £2.1billion and £12 billion by the 2080s.”. “On average, annual damage to properties and their contents due to river and tidal flooding in the UK currently totals

around £1.3billion

” Defra

2011

Defra

2012b

Defra

2012b

Coastal flooding

(Other than terrorism & other malicious attacks)

Inland flooding

2013 2010

From ‘NAAR’ in 2000/2001 to ‘NAFRA’ 2008 (£ billions) ….. modelling flood risk to gauge AAD

NAAR 2000 NAAR 2001 RASP 2002 NAFRA 2004 NAFRA 2005 NAFRA 2006 NAFRA 2008(A) NAFRA 2008(B)

Coverage Damages p.a. (England) Damages p.a. (Wales)

Damages p.a. (total England and Wales (£bn)

Properties affected (England) Properties affected (Wales) Properties affected (total England and Wales) England 0.626

1,797 England and Wales England and Wales 0.801

1,909 1.060

1,741 England and Wales Results not available England and Wales 2.332* Results not available 2,218++ England and Wales But without 1.411

2,137 169 2,306 England and Wales 5.136

2,400 225 2,625

any

1.281

2,400 225 2,625 …. all accompanied by myriad changes in method and data, but with the same aim NAAR = National Assessment of Risk. NAFRA = National Flood Risk Assessment

From ‘NAAR’ in 2000/2001 to ‘NAFRA’ 2008 (£ billions)

NAAR 2000 NAAR 2001 RASP 2002 NAFRA 2004 NAFRA 2005 NAFRA 2006 NAFRA 2008(A) NAFRA 2008(B)

Coverage England and England England England England England England and Wales Wales and Wales and Wales and Wales and Wales Damages p.a. (England) Damages p.a. (Wales)

Damages p.a. (total England and Wales (£bn)

0.626

6 5

0.801

1.060

Results not available 2.332* 1.149

0.262

New flood 1.411

5.136

1.281

Properties affected (England)

2,137 2,400 2,400 on the Properties affected

169 WAAD 225 method 225 (Wales) Properties affected (total England and 1,797

1,909

c. £1bn

1,741 Results not available 2,218++ 2,306 2,625 2,625 Wales)

NAAR NAAR RASP NAFRA NAFRA NAFRA NAFRA NAFRA …. all accompanied by myriad changes in method and data, but with the same aim

Doubts about coastal flood risk: Foresight 2004 (The only mapped RASP result)

23m

£10 millions annual average damage??

24m 9m Most of Blackpool is well above current extreme sea levels if defences are breached 14m

Doubts about all flood risk: The IBM analysis (2006)

They concluded that “the NAFRA model over-states the exposure of the UK economy (to flood losses)” (IBM, 2006, 1).

And that this conclusion “is supported by the views of the relevant experts within Defra and the EA who, from the outset of this (IBM) project, noted that the NAFRA predictions seemed high” (IBM, 2006, 2).

The flood damage record: What have been the historical damage values?

Date

1947 1953 2000 2007

Economic losses at 2010 values

£0.45bn* £5bn £0.79bn

£3.2bn

How can the annual average be c. £1bn if there have only been two (maybe three) floods since 1894 with losses greater than that value ?

* £12m at 1947/8 prices (the £0.45bn may well be too low); + 2000 prices

1,2 1 0,8 0,6 0,4 0,2 0

The flood damage record: ABI data on flood insurance claims (£ billions)

From the ABI Press Release of Nov. 2010 we get an inflation adjusted average for the period 1990-2009 of just

£0.226bn

£0.272bn

The simple average (£0.226bn) has been up-rated by 20% to reflect less than compete

insurance penetration

(c. 90%) and an element for

underinsurance

The flood damage record: Environment Agency data on the number of houses flooded

60 000 50 000 40 000 30 000 20 000 10 000 0 At an average of £30,000 per event, this gives a grossed-up (economic) AAD of

£0.261 bn

The houses > total AAD is factored by the proportion of 2007 losses attributable to the residential sector, adjusted to economic values

The flood damage potential: London’s flood risk (£ billions)

£0,70 £0,60 £0,50 £0,40 £0,30 £0,20 £0,10 £0,00

NAFRA

value for the TE2100 area + all the Thames region: £0.66bn

TE2100 value: £0.07bn

EA Thames region TE2100 non Thames areas: Southern (50%) TE2100 non Thames areas: Anglian (50%) Total Thames Region plus all the TE2100 area TE2100 area AAD Thames area outside TE2100 area

Implied

AAD in the rest of the Thames region of £0.59bn:

This is simply not credible

‘Reversing’ the WAAD analysis:

What

event losses

are ‘needed’ to get to the ‘target’ AAD of £1bn?

18 16 14 12 10 4 2 8 6 0

Eight times the huge 2007 losses of £1.84bn

Residential flood losses, 100-year event Residential flood losses, 50-year event Residential flood losses, 25 year event SOP 25 years SOP 10 years c. £0.38bn

SOP 25 years SOP 10 years c. £0.25bn

SOP 25 years National residential AAD 'targets' at the national SOPs above SOP 10 years c. £0.10bn

WAAD = W

eighted

nnual

verage

amages If

residential

AAD is £0.38bn (to get a total AAD of £1bn), these are the event losses that are needed for the 100- and 50 year events, assuming a ‘national’ mean SOP of 1:10 and 1:25 years

Summary results: Not £1bn+ but less than a third of that (averages = £0.26bn to £0.30bn)

Sources of data

Environment Agency NAFRA 2008 (adjusted by Area teams) National Audit Office (2011) EA residential property numbers flooded (Harmar, 2011), grossed up ABI press release (ABI, 2010) covering 1990-2009 ABI claims average 1998-2009

Annual average loss [£bn]: financial values

N/A N/A

0.491

0.360

Annual average loss [£bn]: economic values

1.281

1.1

0.261

0.192

IBM risk profile (adjusted NAFRA model to historic data) ‘Reversing’ WAAD calculations Simple averages of items in bold (2 significant figures only)

0.606

From residential-only figure of 0.272

N/A N/A

0.49

0.268

From residential-only figure of 0.141

0.500

0.263

0.25 [0.26

* ]

0.30

with the NAFRA-informed IBM result included * Corrected in the

Circulation

Note to 0.322 and 0.26 to allow for insurance penetration

Counter-arguments

Conclusion No. 4: Counter-

£1bn?

and at worst misinformed

You are ignoring climate change Well, we cannot detect ANY ‘signal’ on rivers such as the Thames of increasing flood flows and hence higher losses now to affect current AAD Current floods are likely to be more damaging than floods 20-50 years ago, so you cannot use data from the past (e.g. 1947 and 1953) Yes: a good point BUT there has also been huge investment over that period that should have drawn down losses!

You are missing the key “intangible” losses True, but we ARE comparing like with like, as NAFRA ignores these too You have ignored “surface water flooding” which is a major hazard True: BUT insurance data include these in claims, so the amount remaining from claims totals for NAFRA type fluvial/coastal floods is even less Even a long record misses extremes that add significantly to AAD values Well, we go back to 1947 and to 1894 (Thames). And Merz et al.’s (2009) work in Germany shows that only 20% (2%) of AAD is generally attributable to floods over a 100 (500)-year return period. Floods that are unlikely to

show up in a 50- to 100-year record will never add hugely to AAD.

Up-date

The

Circulation*

Note’s extension of economic damages (residential only)

1,2 1 0,8 Raw data from ABI Deflated to economic values + 22% (see text)

Caveat:

the ABI does not represent the whole market (c. 82%) 0,6 0,4 0,2 0

Penning-Rowsell, E.C. (2014) What do the 2013/14 floods tell us about overall flood risk in England and Wales?

Circulation ,

121, 5-6

Up-date

Paul Samuel’s analysis of the

Circulation

Note’s economic damages (residential only)

Conclusion No. 4b: Up-dating for 2013/14 floods, correcting one small error, and a changed residential/NRP ratio does not change the results to any marked extent

The 2007 flood Up-dated residential fraction of damages: 2000 (45.2%); 2007 (37.9%) & 2013/14 (64.9%). Weighted mean =

41.8%.

Calculated Residential AAD = £0.144bn

Total ADD = £0.34bn

£0.25 [0.26*]

£0.30 billion

PS (12.6.2014): “

I have played with the data and supposed 2007 would be the highest damage if we had 50 years of record. Assuming my use of the Gamma function is correct (need to check this), this changes EAD to

£144 M

from £178 M to give you an idea of the importance of this particular event in the bigger picture. I have ideas for other ways of exploring sensitivities, we should also explore some of the temporal and spatial differences of the 2007 flooding to understand the impact of the event”

A ‘realist’ approach to the extent of flood risk in England and Wales: Conclusions

Conclusion No. 1: the model(s) appears unstable and unreliable Conclusion No. 2: some RASP/NAFRA predictions look badly exaggerated Conclusion No. 3: The likely AAD is £0.26 £0.30bn, not £1.0-£1.3bn

Conclusion No. 4: Counter- arguments are at best weak and at worst misinformed Conclusion No. 4b : Up-dating does not change the results to any marked extent (maybe to £0.34bn) Conclusion No. 5: This exaggeration must not continue; we must be realistic and honest about the risks that we face

(‘Rotterdam 2012, plus’)

A

‘Reality’

approach to flood risk management research

1. Assessing risk 2. Flood warnings 3. Flood insurance 4. Flood victims 5. Spatial planning A concern for fact or utopian ) reality and rejection of the impractical visionary (i.e. the idealistic and or

Edmund Penning-Rowsell

Member: Member:

Flood Hazard Research Centre

http://www.fhrc.mdx.ac.uk

Oxford Water Security Network

www.water.ox.ac.uk

Editor:

Environmental Hazards (Taylor and Francis)

http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehaz Copyright (text) FHRC

FCERM.net Heriot-Watt University, 19 th June 2014